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PROMlSING DEVELOPMENTS FOR CONCEPTUALIZING AND 
MODELING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
Irma Adelman and Thomas F. Head 
Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
University of California 
Berkeley, California 94720 
Kuznets (1966) states that economic growth is a combination of changes in patterns of
production and increases in per capita income and population and that the distinction 
between this and economic development is that economic development is economic growth 
combined with institutional change. Our profession has had difficulty giving proper weight 
to this distinction. We have too readily painted institutions as exogenous or varying 
parametrically and have thus avoided adequate consideration of the institutional aspects of 
economic development. And so we are adding our voice to those who would urge us to come 
to grips more seriously with this issue. 
Institutional changes associated with development have too often been overlooked by 
economists as important areas of research. Institutional change is mentioned frequently, but 
it is seldom studied in the same rigorous manner that one examines other economic adjust-
ments. Much of the writing in this area has not gone beyond the processes of formulating 
taxonomies, identifying linkages, pinpointing institutional constraints, and brainstorming 
about institutional innovations. This largely descriptive work has failed to stock the analytical 
cupboard with the conceptual appratus needed for a disciplined study of institutions. Unease 
with this condition has prompted a new wave of institutional research. 
A necessary preliminary to institutional modeling is a definition of an "institution." Of 
the many possible definitions, the one which appeals to us the most is that an institution is 
a patterned form of interaction among human beings. This definition is very broad and 
encompasses at least three levels of institutions. On the one level we find the cultural values 
and modes that constitute the general framework within which the lower level institutions 
operate. Another level is composed of the laws and regulations which specify what we might 
call "the rules ofthe game." A third level is made up of the contractual arrangements which 
are used to effect transactions. Much of the recent research on institutional questions within
development economics has focused on this last level. 
Proceeding with this definition in mind, we will discuss three topics: first, we will 
describe those aspects of institutions which must be considered when formulating a model;
second, we will present an overview of various conceptual approaches that have been adapted
to study institutions; and, finally, we shall discuss some potential techniques for modeling
institutions. 
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I. Goals and Structure 
What must one be able to specify about an institution in order to adequately model it 
and examine its behavior '! A few thoughts are offered here on what aspects of an institution 
should be included in a description which is good for modeling how institutions emerge and 
change. 
First, one needs to describe the goals of an institution. Four categories of goals come to 
mind. These are (1) growth; (2) insurance and safety; (3) transfer and distribution; and (4) 
enforcement, control, and regulation. It is helpful to view the goals of all institutions as 
mixtures of these four categories. A good example is the family. The family has some growth 
goals as expressed in the coming of a new generation and the provision of an environment for 
the rearing of that generation. It meets an insurance-safety goal by providing a stand by 
capacity for coping with crises generated by any of its members. It is a transfer mechanism 
and, in that function, redistributes income and wealth within and among generations. Children's 
complaints serve as one obvious reminder of the family as an enforcement, control, and 
regulatory mechanism. 
Besides identifying goals, the other major aspect which needs specification is structure. 
How is an institution put together, and how does it work? The various elements of 
institutional structure can be characterized by specifying the principles governing four 
structural aspects : (1) the division of labor, (2) the allocation of resources, (3) the 
system of incentives, (4) the rules for entry and exit, and (5) the rules of interaction with 
the rest of the economic and political system. We will discuss each of these in turn. 
DIVISION OF LABOR 
The pattern of division of labor deals with the assignment of tasks and responsibilities 
within the institution. It may be rigid or fluid, formal or informal. Principles of assignment 
are many. One common example discussed by economists is comparative advantage. Other 
principles, perhaps better known to other social scientists, are habit (which, incidentally, 
might lead to the development of comparative advantage); the voluntary acceptance of 
perceived tasks; and ascriptive principles based on age, sex, caste, or role. 
Furthermore, the pattern of division of labor may be static or dynamic in the sense 
that there may or may not be mobility. For example, in certain tribal societies, the 
principle of division of labor is ascriptive by stages in the life cycle; or the mobility may be 
that of a meritocracy in which dynamic change in assignment of tasks is conditional upon 
performance. It should be noted that the division of labor may vary with the sphere of 
activity, with some core functions being characterized by rigidly specified rules of division 
of labor while some peripheral functions are left fluid, or vice versa. 
ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 
First, one must have a clear idea of the resources involved-labor, financial resources, 
time information, and access-and than a sense of the rules governing the use of these 
resources. We may have allocation by a principle of sharing, by need, by role, etc. Also, 
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the resource constraints may be tight or loose as in budget or labor constraints. 
corporations, for example, do not have very binding budget constraints, nor do many larg~
private enterprises. Large enterprises can go to the stock market and have access to 
borrowing. By contrast, small businesses generally have fairly binding budget constraints· 
and individuals often have very binding budget constraints. Examination ofthe laoo; 
constraints shows a somewhat different pattern. In the case of public enterprises, we see 
a reasonably binding labor constraint. Family enterprises, on the other hand, have rather 
loose labor constraints especially in societies characterized by extended families. 
SYSTEM OF INCENTIVES 
The third class of structural aspects which one needs to describe is the system or
incentives. Kenneth Boulding {1981) distinguishes three such systems: threat, exchange, 
and love. These three systems, respectively, picture an economic agent taking some action 
in order to avoid some negative impact, in order to attain some positive reward, or as 
a one-way transfer or grant which does not involve any apparent reward/penalty motivation. 
The exercise of power takes place both through threat and through exchange. We speak 
of a firm having market power when it can credibly threaten to implement strategies which 
have the potential to harm competitors. Within organizations, we clearly see behavior 
motivated by both mechanisms of reward and mechanisms of penalty. One obvious example 
of the system of love is child rearing or the grants economy, but Boulding argues that we 
have underemphasized this system in our study of economics and that one-way transfers are 
a wide-spread phenomenon which deserves more careful scrutiny. 
When we examine any particular institution or organization, we, of course, observe a 
mixture of each of these systems of incentives. And each system will be consonant to 
varying degrees with the ethos of the institution, its goals, and the larger society of which 
it is a part. Furthermore, the design and implementation of incentive systems leads to 
varying degrees of effectiveness. As an example, consider Lester Thurow's {1981) point that 
the system of incentives for management performance-quarter-by-quarter profits-is very poorly 
designed to serve the dynamic growth goals of a firm which may require investing now and 
thus, lowering current profits in order to increase profits later. It is, however, quite 
consistent with the general ethos of the society at large. Another illustration comes from 
the Me Namara years at the World Bank where one observed a conflict between two Bank 
objectives : disbursing funds as quickly as possible and designing programs which would 
effectively meet the poverty alleviation goals that Me Namara emphasized. Such poverty-
alleviation programs often require a higher proportion of design and administration costs 
than do public works programs. It was easier to disburse funds quickly by building 
roads, ports, and dams; but these were not necessarily the most efficient means of achieving 
poverty alleviation. So the two sytems of incentives were in conflict. 
ENTRY, EXIT AND INTERACTION 
Finally, one needs to specify those aspects of structure which have to do with entry, 
exit, and interaction with the environment. Frequently, formation, dissolution and inter-
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action are regulated by law. For example, the rules for establishing and dissolving a 
marriage are governed by law, whereas the rules of operation within the marriage are largely 
left open to the explicit and implicit contractual negotiations of the partners. In the commer-
cial arena, we are all familiar with the variety of regulatory activities which shape the rules of 
entry, exit, and interaction. 
Up to this point, we have mentioned four classes of goals and have discussed five aspects 
of structure. This inventory has been far from exhaustive; but we hope that it, at least, 
points to the important components of a static description of an institution. As we have 
noted frequently along the way, every institution is a complex mixture of the characteristics 
identified above. Thus, an institution might best be defined by the degree to which each des-
cription is valid in each realm. 
Having formed some sense of the static view of an institution, we can now examine some 
of the more important conceptual approaches to the study of the dynamics of institutional 
change. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE : CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES 
We review here recent contributions to the economic theory of institutions. However, 
before proceeding to contemporary works, at least brief acknowledgement must be given to 
the major figures in the history of economic thought who have trod the ground of institutional 
inquiry. Without any claim of comprehensiveness, we select for comment Karl Marx (1925) 
John R. Commons (1934), Thorstein Veblen 0973), and Wesley C. Mitchell (1949). 
Marx, in a category by himself as the founding and dominant figure of a major school of 
economic and political thought, obviously concerned himself with the structure of society and 
with the generation of a perspective that did not take institutions as exogenously given but, in-
stead, attempted to explain class formation, the interaction of classes, and transformations from 
one economic order to another. Of central concern in the Marxian theory of value and exploita-
tion are the institutions of tabor exchange and the related pattern of ownership and control of 
the means of production. The expropriation of surplus product under various institutions of 
labor exchange and the mechanisms of transformation from feudalism to capitalism and sub-
sequently to socialism represent essential lines of inquiry to the Marxist. Particular emphasis 
in recent years has been placed on the theory of the state [de Janvry ( 1981, pp. 183-197), 
Jessop (1977), and Holloway and Picciotto (1979)]. 
We should not proceed without acknowledgement of the group of American economists 
known as the Institutionalists. The dominant personalities in this chapter in the history of 
economic thought were Veblen (1973), Commons (1934), and Mitchell (1949). These writers 
shared a preoccupation with institutional variables -Veblen emphasizing cultural patterns 
and customs; Commons focusing on labor, industrial organization, and the legal foundations 
of economic transactions; and Mitchell attempting to advance the understanding of economic 
institutions through gathering voluminous statistical data about them. The Institutionalists 
reacted to a perceived narrowness of both the content and the methodology of the orthodoxy 
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of their day; however they failed to establish a lasting major alternative school of thought and 
are remembered today largely as eccentrics rather than major figures in the development 
economic theory. 
While the very mention of the term institution brings to mind the former Institutionallistf· 
it should be clear that most modern economists who focus upon institutions would not single 
out the Institutionalists as intellectual ancestors of particular importance to their work 
would these modern economists, in general, seek to separate themselves from the ma.m•:.r .. ,_ 
of economic thought. A typical disclaimer is that of James Roumasset (1978): "In explain· 
ing the existence and evolution of institutions the new institutional economics uses coJ~V~!"''"'" 
nal economic tools such as benefits, costs andequlibrium. In explaining resource allocation 
and income distribution, the new approach uses institutions in conjunction with rather than 
as an alternative to neoclassical theory" (pp 1 and 2). The modern investigators are, in 
general, attempting to endogenize significant phenomena which hitherto have often been assu. 
med as exogenously given; these researchers frequently modify and expand their theoretical.
and methodological "tool kits" but very rarely find themselves desiring to be set apart from 
the main stream of economists, in some cases the treatment of institutions has involved a 
new championing of neoclassical economics. 
In reviewing the modern institutional economics, three general approaches will be discus. 
sed : cost benefit, conflict crisis, and sociobiology. Each is associated with a different, but 
sometimes overlapping, group of scholars and body of literature. 
COST BENEFIT 
This class of approaches to institutional change posits that, when the expected cost is 
lower than the expected benefit, an institution will be formed and that this will be efficient 
from the point of view of society at large. An important qualification to this argument is 
that introduced by the free-rider problem (Olson, 1965); there may well be net benefit for 
society as a whole, but to each agent the benefit is so small that it pays to wait for others 
to take the lead in reorganizing institutions. 
A variant of this approach is the rent-seeking school [Krueger (1974) and Bhagwati 
(1980)] which says that various interest groups will lobby for institutional changes when 
the costs to them of such changes are smaller then the benefits; this approach recognizes 
explicitly that what is good for the rentseekers may or may not be good for society as a 
whole. Indeed, it is likely not to be good for society as a whole; and it is likely to drive 
society as a whole to second-best or third-best situations. A qualification to this approach 
is offered by the "fallacy of composition," i.e., because the activities of different special 
interest groups may tend to cancel one another, the sum of their effects may be less than the 
effect of each individual part (Olson, 1982). Hence, the rent-seeking activities of individual 
groups may come to naught. 
The boldest exponent of the cost-benefit approach to the modeling of institutions is 
Gary Becker in whose work a wide range of behavioral norms (Becker, 1974) from 
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discrimination to marriage (Becker, 1973) and altruism (Becker, 1976) are analyzed as 
market phenomena. Although Becker has come to symbolize an extreme example in this 
regard, he is certainly not alone in his desire to understand social institutions from the 
perspective of neoclassical economics. For example, major contributions focusing on 
property rights and public choice have been made by Demsetz (1967, 1969) and Alchain 
and Demsetz (1972) [see also Downs (1958) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962)). In a 
similar vein, questions in the economic history of institutional change have been treated by 
Douglas North and his collaborators [Davis and North (1970, 1971) and North and Thomas 
(1970)]. Most recently, North (1981) has called attention to the costs of defining and 
enforcing the contractual rules that underly institutions which he calls transactions costs. 
Transactions costs increase with specialization and reduce the net benefits from exchange 
and trade. They are also affected by ideology. Although each of these-investigators has 
his own unique outlook and questions, they all proceed from the common point of departure 
that neoclassical theory -a conceptual tool kit that has been very successful in explaining 
market behavior-also has great usefulness in understanding non-market decision making. 
A major disadvantage of the cost-benefit school is that it admits to only one class of 
goals, namely, the utility-enhancing, growth-oriented, efficiency oriented goals. It does not 
take into account insurance and safety goals and only poorly accommodates distributional 
and regulatory goals. Also, this literature offers only two kinds of conflict-resolution 
mechanisms-payoff or coercion and thus does not give appropriate attention to com-
promise-oriented mechanisms. 
In the development literature neoclassical analysis of institutions has been applied to the 
analysis of contractual arrangements in sharecropping [Cheung (1969)] and Bardhan and 
Singh (forthcoming)]; the choice of tenancy forms [Bardhan, (1977)]; and analysis of 
imperfect, interlocking factor markets (particularly credit and land) in the rural sectors of 
developing economies [Bardhan, (1980)]. The institutional arrangements for access to 
factors of production are viewed as evolving to overcome two types of transactions costs: 
imperfect information (e.g., concerning the quality of the tenants' input decisions) and/or 
incomplete markets (e.g., for credit to the tenant and for insurance against risk). 
Written more broadly, the dynamies of institutional change in the development process 
have been emphasized by Hayami and Ruttan (1971) [see also Binswanger and Ruttan 
(1978)]. This line of inquiry examines the economic inducements to technical and 
institutional change. Particular emphasis has been given to the process of public sector 
research and to the institutional structure through which change is facilitated. By contrast 
to the view that sees institutions as constraints to technical change and development, Hayami 
and Ruttan argue that ''institutional reform is appropriately viewed more as a response to 
the new opportunities for the productive use of human and material resources opened up by 
advances in technology than as a precondition for agricultural development" (p. 258). In 
a more general sence, institutional change is portrayed as a significant element in the process 
of adaptation to changing economic circumstances. As costs and opportunities change, 
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a society is faced with the challenge of altering its behavioral rules and patterns to fit new 
circumstances. Hayami (1980) has developed an economic approach to village community 
and institutions; he hypothesizes that the relative resource scarcity in a community determines 
the degree of tightness of its community structure. Resource scarcity requires efficient 
coordination and, therefore, engenders the need for greater control and enforcement. 
CONFLICT CRISIS 
The other major approach on which economists have relied for an understanding of ins-
titutional dynamics is that which focuses on conflict and the economic crises generated by 
these conflicts. The classical Marxist statement is that institutional change originates in class 
struggle. The motivation for institutional change is the tension between what we would call 
the optimally achievable output at a given technology frontier (i.e., the forces of production) 
and the achievable output with given institutional class relations in the production process 
(i.e., the relations of production). The gap between the two may be viewed as an indicator 
of the potential benefits of change. 
When this gap is large, which is our way of saying that the relations of production are 
fetters upon the forces of production, class struggle emerges and change is set in motion. 
The growth orientation of capitalists is seen as a prime mover in this process. To quote 
Marx (1925): "Accumulate, accumulate, that is Moses and the Prophets." In more modern 
language, we have Joan Robinson's (1956) reference to "animal spirits." By contrast to the 
neoclassical cost-benefit principle, the cause of change here is a growth orientation in which 
there is little or no explicit cost consideration. Change is dialectic-the result of internal 
contradictions-which means that the process is non smooth and occurs in jumps. As is dis-
cussed below, these features have important implications for the selection of modeling 
techniques. 
Working within this general framework, Alain de Janvry's (1981) model of institutional 
change in nonsocialist societies states that the dialectic generated by the dynamics of the 
economic system creates a legitimacy crisis at the political level. Governments can respond 
in three possible ways: with cosmetic changes, with institutional reforms, or with repression 
designed to avert institutional reforms. Modeling these events depends not only on the sele-
ction of a dynamic model of the economy but, also, on the specification of those components 
which define a legitimacy gap and the political response to the gap. Thus, one needs an 
expectation-generating mechanism to forecast a future path; an evaluation or norm-generating 
mechanism to evaluate whether the expected future path is good, bad, or indifferent; and a 
government response function representing the political decision process in the context of the 
legitimacy crises generated by the gap between the expected future path and the morally and 
ideologically acceptable path. Our view is that the implementation of such a model would 
be both feasible and interesting. A reinterpretation of a Marxian model of socialist dynamic 
is presented in the very interesting book by Roemer (1983). 
E 
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SOCIOBIOLOGY 
A third conceptual approach comes from outside the conventional boundaries of econo-
mic inquiry and is distinguished from other models by its assumption that there is a system 
and that this system has a mind of its own. In other words, there is such a thing as an 
ethos for a given institution; and this ethos is over and above the motivations of constituent 
members. Therefore, we take the sociobiology approach to mean that the system, as a 
whole, has an objective function which is being optimized; and the objective function that 
is generally chosen maximizes survival probability. In our context, then, the objective func-
tion that is being optimized is that which maximizes the survival probability of the institu-
tion itself. 
Operationalizing the sociobiology view with respect to institutions requires solving some 
thorny problems. In particular, whose survival probability is being maximized ? The diffi-
culty is illustrated by looking at an example such as termites-a very fascinating natural system. 
Here the system of division of labor has been engrained genetically. Some members can only 
reproduce but cannot feed themselves and cannot defend themselves; those in another 
group can feed themselves and others, but cannot defend themselves; and another 
group (the warriors) can defend the system but cannot feed themselves or reproduce. Signals 
of the needs for each type of member are transmitted through the mix of nutrients which the 
reproducing termites receive in their food. In such a system, defining whose survival is 
being maximized is, indeed, a challenge; clearly, the system minimizes the probability of sur-
vival of any single class of members and thereby maximizes the probability of survival of the 
interactive system. It is not unusual to find similar complexities when studying highly 
developed social institutions. 
Other issues which need to be addressed are the time horizon over which survival pro-
bability is maximized and the difference between short-run and long-run maximization. Some 
systems with very long survival horizons and survival capacity, such as the predator-prey 
systems, have a cycle of survival built into them. On the human level, we need to ask what 
purposes are served by wanings and risings and how long-run survival capacity may be dis· 
turbed by attempts to eliminate cycles. 
Elements of this sociobiological approach can be seen in Eric Jones' (1981) interpretation 
of economic history in which he links the character and frequency of disasters in Asia and in 
Europe to the differences in cultural and social patterns found in these two regions of the 
world. His theory posits that the incidence of natural disasters, such as large- scale floods and 
earthquakes, has been much larger in Asia than in Europe and that this has had a significant 
impact on the evolving social structure and on the demographic pattern. For example, 
floods have required the mobilization of large masses of individuals in order to cope with 
prevention and containment; this had led to breeding to the maximum capacity and to auto-
cratic, hierarchic systems of organization. By contrast, the much lower incidence of such 
catastrophes in Europe is seen to have resulted in smaller families, greater investment in the 
education of children, and decentralization. His thesis is, of course, needs to validate it 
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more carefully than he has done. (One glaring problem is that his incidence of disaster is 
not normalized with respect to area.) However, it is a promising line of research and 
interesting because of its very sweep. 
Nelson and Winter"s (1982) evolutionary theory of economic organizations offers another 
example of a biological approach to economic institutions. Organizations evolve routines 
for carrying out all of their activities (production, innovation, sales, decision making). 
Natural selection guides the evolution of these routines and yields a process of long-term 
change. In development literature bJsed on research in the Amazon, Norgaard (1981), 
emphasizes the linkages between agricultural activity, the ecosystem, and social organization. 
John P. Powelson (1972) undertakes the Herculean task of explaining the process of growth 
through a study of institutional selection and institutional effectiveness that draws not only 
on economic theory but also the work of sociologists and political scientists. Powelson, like 
North, covers a wide canvas; however, the theoreticJI underpinnings of Powelson's work 
are less focused and more tentative than North's and thus have not offered a clear target for 
criticism or a concrete paradigm stimulating a new body of research. 
III TECHNIQUES FOR MODELING INSTITUTIONS 
After having described the essential elements of institutions and having discussed three 
important conceptual approaches to institutional research, we wish to conclude by briefly 
surveying potentially interesting, underutilized techniques for modeling specific aspects of 
institutional change. We shall not discuss the neoclassical approach based on marginal 
economics because it is too familiar. 
GAME THEORY 
The evolution of institutions can be characterized by means of game theory as resulting 
from a process of multilateral decision making. Indeed, Shubik (1982) states that "a theory 
of games is, among other things, a theory of organization" (p.7). Its application to economics 
dates to Cournot (1897) and Edgeworth (1881), but it is only recently that solution possibi· 
lities for interestingly formulated games involving more than two players and uncertainty 
have become possible. The Harsanyi and Selten (1972) and forthcoming approach to n· 
person noncooperative games with incomplete information offers a most promising vehicle 
for the study of institutional change. 
An interesting application of game theory to the modeling of the U.S. economy, as 
described by the interaction between regulated economic entities and the regulatory mecha-
nisms, is given in Reiter and Hughes (1981). 
In economic development, game theoretic approaches have been used in analyzing 
contractural arrangements in agriculture. A representative sampling of this very active 
literature includes the work of Newbery and Stiglitz who have provided theoretical treat-
ments of sharecropping with emphasis on imperfect information and risk sharing [Newbery 
(1975, 1977), Stiglitz (1974), and Newbery and Stiglitz (1979)]. Bell and Zusman (1976, 1980) 
have considered these issues in the context of a model in which the contract between landlord 
and tenant is the outcome of a simultaneous dyadic bargaining process. The interlinked 
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nature of transactions in land, labor, and credit in rural factor markets has been given 
particular attention in the modeling efforts of Braverman and Srinivasan (1979) and 
Braverman and Stiglitz (1981, 1982). An excellent critical survey of the literature on contrac· 
tual arrangements and rural labor markets in developing countries has recently been written 
by Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1981). 
Moving away from the development literature, two recent contributions to the general 
economic literature on institutions should be noted. Both works employ game theory believ· 
ing that it offers the most fruitful framework for studying the institutional changes that 
merge from the interaction of maximizing individuals. Thompson and Faith (1981) build 
a hierarchical model of strategic behavior which they argue has particular applicability to 
the choice of political-economic systems. With an eye toward developing a general model 
suitable for examining the evolution of property rights, systems of coordination, political 
organizations, and other institutions which solve recurring social and economic problems, 
Andrew Schotter (1981) makes a major contribution to the institutional literature. In parti· 
cu1ar, Chapter 3, "A Mathematical Theory of Institution Creation," coauthored with S. 
Berman, presents an n-person, noncooperative supergame in which agents make repeated 
choices over an infinite time horizon. Schotter wants to build a model in which the history 
of the play of the game impacts the choices made; this leads him to a mathematical formula· 
tion in which selected and surviving social institutions are the absorbing: state of a stochastic 
process. Although Schetter's theory is presented in a provisional manner and "in no way 
purports to be fully mature," it does make a substantial contribution to its stated intent of 
being a "first step in an attempt to liberate economics from its fixation on competitive 
markets as an ax-all-encompassing institutional framework" (pages xi and 1). Schotter has 
developed one of the more significant formal models of institutional change to date. 
STOCHASTIC LEARNING THEORY 
Another modeling technique which has some potential is that of stochastic learning 
theory developed and utilized, largely independently, by engineers studying the design of 
learning robots and by psychologists studying human learning. In both cases learning is 
not so much a matter of collecting and using information as it is the changing of behavior 
in response to a stochastic system of reinforcements. In very simple terms stochastic 
learning theory offers a mathematical framework for modeling how experience gets translated 
into behavior: the behavior of humans; the behavior of robots; and, it is suggested here, the 
behavior of institutions such as universities, governments, bureaucracies, or foreign policy 
establishments. This approach seems particulary consonant with the sociobiology, evolu-
tionary view of institutional growth. 
The essence of stochastic learning models is represented in the reinforcement or adjust-
ment schemes used. An action is taken by a given actor in ignorance of the state of the 
environment as described by a probability distribution on outcomes. In general, when an 
action is successful in a given period the probability of selecting that action in the next period 
is increased; and the probabilities of all other actions are decreased. The choice of how to 
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adjust the probabilities of successive successful choices is called the reinforcement scheme. 
Under some linear reinforcement schemes, the "learner" converges upon a constant probabi-
lity. Thus, the agent "learns" about the probability set facing him that describes the nature 
of the payoff to choices in a random environment. 
The pioneering work on learning models in mathematical psychology was done by Bush 
and Mosteller (1955). Subsequent studies included treatments by Atkinson, Bower, and 
Crothers (1965) who extended the analysis to group interaction and oligopoly. Much of the 
work by engineers has been done in the Soviet Union [e.g., Tsetlin (1961), Tsypkin (1971, 
1973), and Tsypkin and Poznyak (1977)]. Tsetlin's work (1973) has included applications 
to biological systems. In this country, Narendra and associates have made many contri-
butions to the literature including a major survey [Narendra and Thathachar (1974)]. Also 
noteworthy is the volume of articles edited by Narendra which contains an extensive 
"Bibliography on Learning Automata" compiled by Lakshmivarahan (1977). K. Fu and 
associates (1970), 197la, 197lb) have treated learning automata extensively within the context 
of adaptive control theory and pattern recognition. 
The general subject of stochastic learning systems ha' received rigorous mathematical 
treatment by Losifescu and Theodorescu (1969) and by Norman (1972). A principal investi-
gator among economists using learning models has been Cross (1973) who presents a general 
theory of stochastic learning in economic behavior; his later works apply that theory to 
migration and to consumer behavior (Cross, 1979). Schmalensee (1972) evaluates the appli-
cability of stochastic learning models to both firm and household choices under uncertainty, 
and Himmelweit (1976) formulates a production model based on stochastic learning. Bray 
and Kreps (1981) use stochastic learning theory to demonstrate that any rational learning 
model leads to convergence to a set of rational expectations. Stochastic learning models 
have not been applied to economic development or to institutional modeling. However, we 
believe that the incorporation of stochastic learning behavior into a game theoretic frame-
work offers a particularly rich and versatile modeling tool for the study of the dynamic 
interaction between institutions and their environments. A study of implicit labor contracts 
in a kibbutz is currently underway using this approach (Dodge, forthcoming). 
The theory of self-organizing systems - an extension of stochastic learning models to 
assemblies of stochastic automata comes from mathematical statistics and provides another 
interesting and underexploited class of techniques [Borovikov and Bryzgalov (1965), Tsetlin 
and Krylov (1963), and Whittle (1965a, 1965b, and 1972)]. The theory posits an ensemble 
of objects that are not differentiated but eventually evolve into patterns of specialization due 
to the impact of exogenous stimuli and/or endogenous reinforcement. This approach has 
been applied to exploring the impact of system size on the complexity of the system of 
division of labor [Whittle (1977)]. It would appear to offer an interesting approach to the 
modeling of village community behavior. 
FUZZY SETS 
Another class of interesting techniques for modeling institutions is offered by the theory 
of fuzzy sets [Zadeh (1973) and Bellman and Zadeh (1970)). A good summary technical 
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exposition is available in Kaufmann (1975). We find in fuzzy-set theory the capacity to 
model something we stressed in tl1e description of institutions, namely, that things are seldom 
purely A or purely B but usually are some of A and some of B. By contrast to ordinary 
set theory in which an object can be a member of a single set only, fuzzy sets allow us 
to speak in terms of the degree of membership of an object in a set. For example, we can 
speak of a labor constraint having a degree of membership of '8 in a set of binding cons-
traints and a '2 or '3 degree of membership in the set of nonbinding constraints. This 
approach has an added advantage in th1t the calculus of optimizing fuzzy sets is actually 
simpler than that of usual optimization problems [see, for example, Yager (1975, 1977)]. 
Conceptually, one would specify a set of alternative structures, Xt, and objectives, AJ, 
and associate with each structure a number between 0 and 1 which is indicative of how well 
structure Xt satisfies objective AJ. (This then specifies the objectives as fuzzy sets of the struc-
tures, Xt.) Then, using rules developed by Bellman and Zadeh ( 1970) and Zadeh (1973), one 
can associate with each structure a number, D(Xt), which is indic.Ltive of how well the struc-
ture satisfies the totality of all the multiple objectives, AJ. lt then becomes a simple matter to 
optimize Xt by choosing that structure which maximizes the multiple objectives [i.e., has the 
largest or smallest value D(Xt)]. 
As a method of treating institutional change, this technique has the major advantages of 
being able to represent both vague (or fuzzy) objectives and precisely defined objectives and 
of being able to handle both subjective and objective evaluation procedures. 
This approach has not as yet been applied in economics. There is a burgeoning literature 
in operations research; and a journal, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, is devoted to theoretical and 
applied issues related to fuzzy sets. The approach would seem particulary applicable to issues 
relating to institutional design for the delivery of specific services (e.g., credit, research and 
development, or water). 
CATASTROPHY THEORY 
Catastrophy theory is an interesting approach because it is capable of modeling discrete 
choices and the dynamics of discrete choice. It is particulary well suited to the modeling of 
dialectically generated change and, hence, applicable to Marxian models of institutional 
evolution. Furthermore, it is now possible to do some econometrics with catastrophe mani-
folds, which. means that there now exists the possibility of validating these models [Cobb 
(1978 ,1981), Adelman and Hihn (1982, 1983)]. 
The theory was originated by Thorn (1975) and has subsequently been applied to a 
variety of biological and social phenomena by Zeeman ( 1977), Stewart and Woodcock ( 1981), 
and others too numerous to list. Good mathematical expositions are given in Poston and 
Stewart (1978) and Woodcock and Davis (1978). 
Catastrophe theory is a very recent and controversial extension of differential calculus. 
Catastrophe theoretic models posit the existence of a system of differential equations in which 
the motion of the system is a general function of both the state variables (X) and their para-
meters (a), dX/dt=f(X, a). Both the state variables and the parameters change systematically 
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ver time, but the parameters change much more slowly. For some combinations of value 
fthe parameters, a, the system h1s a single solution; for others, it has multiple solutions. 
{here multiple solutions exist, a short-run equilibrium can jump from one region in the state 
>ace to another and, therefore, can exhibit large discontinuities for small changes in para-
leter values. Thorn's basic insight was that the behavior of discontinuous relationships and 
llStable equilibria can be described in canonical form by an f (X, a) which is one of a small 
~mber of polynomial forms that are themselves continuous. 
Economic applications of catastrophe theory h1ve been few. Varian (1979) has employed 
to construct a generalization of Kaldor's (1940) model of the trade cycle. Wiseman and 
arayia (1981) have reviewed its applications to urban system. Mees (1975) has used it to 
odel the revival of medieval cities after the black death. More generally, Renfrew and Poston 
979) hwe used catastrophe theory to explain discontinuities in settlement patterns of tradi-
lnal farming communities. Adelman and Hihn (1982) have applied it to the analysis of 
:onomic forces behind discontinuous changes in economic ideology of political regimes in 
:veloping countries, especially Latin America. 
ONCLUSION 
In an address to an annual meeting of the American Agricultural Economics Association, 
obel laureate T. W. Schultz (1968) S.'tid : 
"It is currently a mark of sophistication in presenting economic models not to men-
tion institutions. But for all that, it is a significant trait of contemporary economics that, 
despite this omission, it manages somehow to find support for institutional change. It is 
a neat trick, but it cannot hide the fact that, in thinking about institutions, the analy-
tical cupboard is bare" (p. 1113). 
In the years since Schultz made these remarks, attitudes, as well as techniques, have 
1dergone change. Yet despite these shifts, the economics profession is still far from having 
·rived at an accepted and well-tested theoretical framework for the analysis of institutional 
1ange. We have considered here the current state of knowledge and the potential future 
rections in modeling institutional change with particular reference to the study of develo-
ng countries. 
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